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ABSTRACT
Private collection of statistics from a large distributed population is
an important problem, and has led to large scale deployments from
several leading technology companies. The dominant approach re-
quires each user to randomly perturb their input, leading to guaran-
tees in the local differential privacy model. In this paper, we place
the various approaches that have been suggested into a common
framework, and perform an extensive series of experiments to un-
derstand the tradeoffs between different implementation choices.
Our conclusion is that for the core problems of frequency estima-
tion and heavy hitter identification, careful choice of algorithms
can lead to very effective solutions that scale to millions of users.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Collecting frequency statistics underpins a wide range of modern
data analytics tasks, from simple popularity charts to more com-
plex machine learning tools. If we can centrally collect and aggre-
gate the raw data, then producing such statistics involves relatively
simple data manipulation. However, in many cases the inputs can
be considered sensitive, describing an individual’s actions, prefer-
ences or characteristics. As such, the data subjects may be reluc-
tant to divulge their true information, even if the overall statistics
would be valuable and socially useful. For example, consider a mo-
bile app that has access to a user’s location. Understanding the
overall population distribution, where people like to visit at par-
ticular times, and how they move around, has shown to be very
valuable for social studies, urban planning, and tracking disease
spread. However, any individual’s location can be sensitive, allow-
ing inferences to be made on their health (if they attend a clinic),
religious preference (if they attend a place of worship), sexuality (if
they attend a group or club), and more. For these reasons, users of
the app would understandably be unwilling to share their location
information freely with the app.
In recent years, a number of privacy-preserving solutions to
this frequency estimation question have been developed and de-
ployed by large technology companies, such as Apple, Google and
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Microsoft. These deployments differ in the details, but share some
common DNA; they are all based on the notion of Local Differ-
ential Privacy, an instantiation of the statistical model of differen-
tial privacy which is applied by each user directly to their own
data. At the heart of these protocols, each user is asked a simple
question about their data by a data analyst. The user then deter-
mines randomly whether to answer the question truthfully, or to
pick some false response, according to a specified probability distri-
bution. This randomization gives each user “plausible deniability”,
and protects their privacy. To fully specify a protocol, we need to
determine what questions are asked, and what probability distribu-
tion is used over the set of possible answers. We also need to show
how the data analyst can combine the answers to build a picture
of the overall frequency distribution, and understand the accuracy
of the results.
In this overview and evaluation paper, we seek to draw together
the various approaches (both theoretical and applied) that have
been proposed for this core problem, and place them in a com-
mon framework. We show that protocols can be understood as
combining four “layers”: (1) A basic “frequency oracle” that allows
frequencies to be estimated over a moderate sized discrete set of
possibilities; (2) A “sketch” that can reduce the domain size of pos-
sibilities; (3) A “heavy hitters” method that can find frequent items
within a large domain; (4) Post-processing techniques that enforce
some constraints on the results to improve accuracy. Existing pro-
tocols can then be expressed by specifying a particular choice of
algorithm for each of the four layers.
Having described the choices in the four layers, we go on to
perform a sequence of experiments that demonstrate the different
behaviors of different choices of each component, in terms of their
accuracy and scalability (speed) as a function of privacy level, do-
main size, and other parameter settings. This leads us to recom-
mend particular combinations for this task, and to deprecate oth-
ers. Although not our main objective, we suggest some alterna-
tive choices that have not previously been considered (based on
sampling hash functions), and show that these equal best-in-class
performance. Meanwhile, we show that the first approaches that
were introduced for these problems and popularized them are dom-
inated by more advanced techniques that came afterwards.
Outline. We proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the prob-
lem definitions and key technical concepts. We describe the four
layers of a private heavy hitters protocol in turn: first we summa-
rize the “frequency oracles” which are the basis of all solutions
in Section 3. The other three layers of a scheme are domain size
reduction (Section 4), heavy hitter search (Section 5), and post-
processing (Section 6). We structure our experimental study into
two parts: calibration and study of the basic frequency estimation
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task (Section 7), and comparative evaluation on the heavy hitters
task (Section 8). We summarize our findings in Section 9.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
The definition of differential privacy for a randomized procedure
requires that the output distribution for inputs that are similar
(“neighboring”). The additional requirement to satisfy local differ-
ential privacy is that this should apply to the output distribution of
each data owner, rather than just on the overall output of a central-
ized procedure. More formally, we consider a collection of = data
owners, who each holds some input G8 . We assume that each item
G8 ∈ D is drawn from some domain D of size |D| = 3 . We write
4 ( 9) as the basis vector of dimension 3 such that 4
( 9)
9 = 1, and 0
otherwise. Each user will apply a local randomizer R to their input
to obtain an output from a domain Y, so that R : D → Y.
Definition 2.1 (Local differential privacy). The local randomized
R is n-locally differentially private (n-LDP) if for all pairs of inputs
G ∈ D, G ′ ∈ D and outputs ~ ∈ Y we have that
Pr[R (G)=~ ]
Pr[R (G ′)=~ ]
≤ 4n .
The objective is then to obtain the best accuracy for a particular
task while guaranteeing the n-LDP property. Further background
and discussion of local differential privacy is presented in recent
surveys and tutorials [8, 17, 19].
2.2 Frequency Estimation and Heavy Hitters
With the same setup as the previous section, we define the (raw)
frequency of item G ∈ D to be 5 (G) = |{8 : G8 = G}|. That is,
we simply count the number of occurrences of item G among the
population. Natural variations consider a weighted version of this
definition, but our focus here is on the unweighted (unit weight)
notion. Our objective will be to obtain a (private, randomized) esti-
mator 5̂ for 5 . We will typically be interested in estimators 5̂ that
are unbiased, that is E[ 5̂ (G)] = 5 (G), and which have small error
| 5̂ (G) − 5 (G) |. When the estimator is unbiased, the mean squared
error is equivalent to the variance, E[( 5̂ (G) − 5 (G))2]. The heavy
hitters are items G whose frequency is large – this is often formal-
ized to be those items which exceed a threshold of the total weight
or total sum of squares, or are in the top-: largest weights.
2.3 Hadamard Transformation
Several private mechanisms depend on the Hadamard transforma-
tion, which is a particular instance of a discrete Fourier transform.
It is an orthogonal transform q , described by a 3 × 3 matrix with
q8, 9 = 3
−1/2(−1) 〈8, 9 〉 , where 3 is a power of 2, and 〈8, 9〉 counts the
number of indices in the binary representations of 8 and 9 where
both have 1 bit. Given a vector G of dimension 3 , the Hadamard
transformation of G is the vector of coefficients Θ = qG) . For gen-
eral G this can be computed efficiently in time $ (3 log3), but we
often apply this to sparse inputs and find one coefficient, which
can be done with a constant number of mathematical operations.
3 FREQUENCY ORACLES
The notion of a frequency oracle has emerged from a sequence of
works in differential privacy as an LDP mechanism for frequency
estimation. Oracles vary in their construction, accuracy guaran-
tees, and the size of domain for which they are best suited.
3.1 “Pure” Protocols
A useful abstraction introduced by Wang et al. [15] is the notion
of a ‘pure’ protocol for frequency estimation. A protocol is con-
sidered to be pure if its output can be interpreted as expressing
“support” for a subset of possible input values, encoded as supp(~).
Pure protocols are characterized by two probabilities, ?∗ and @∗, so
that Pr[R(G) ∈ {~ : G ∈ supp(~)}] = ?∗, which encodes the prob-
ability that input G is mapped to an output that supports G ; and
Pr[R(G ′) ∈ {~ : G ∈ supp(~)}] = @∗ for all G ′ ≠ G , which encodes
the (lower) probability that an input G ′ is mapped to an input that
supports G for every G ′ ≠ G .
Many of the frequency oracles below are instances of a pure pro-
tocol,whichmakes their analysis convenient. The n-LDP condition
is satisfied provided ?∗/@∗ ≤ 4n . To aggregate the responses from a
pure protocol to make an estimate 5̂ (G), for each report~8 = R(G8),
we compute 5̂8 (G) =
IG∈supp(~8 )−@
∗
?∗−@∗ where I% is the function that is
1 if % is true, and 0 otherwise. We can verify that
E[ 5̂8 (G)] = (E[R(G8) ∈ {~ : G ∈ supp(~)}] − @
∗)/(?∗ − @∗)
which simplifies to 1 if G8 = G , and 0 if G8 ≠ G .
The contribution to the (conditional) variance of this estimator
for each user 8 can be computed for the two cases, as:
Var[ 5̂8 (G)] =







if G = G8 (1)
@∗(1 − @∗)
(?∗ − @∗)2
if G ≠G8 (2)
The overall estimate 5̂ (G) is the sum of the individual estimates,
and its variance is the sum of these variances. The exact value of
the overall estimate’s variance will depend on the true frequency
of G in the input. If we assume that the domain is large and no
input dominates the others, then this expression is determined by
the expression in @, and we can focus on the contribution to the
variance from the G ≠ G8 case in (2).
3.2 Direct Encoding (DE)
The idea of direct encoding (also known as randomized response)
is to set the output range to be the same as the input, i.e., Y = D,
and to have some probability of providing a “false” response, while
maximizing the likelihood of giving a “truthful” response [12, 15].
If we set the truthful probability to be Pr[R(G) = G] = ? , then for
any ~ ≠ G we must have Pr[R(G) = ~] = (1 − ?)/(3 − 1) = @
and LDP requires ?/((1 − ?)/(3 − 1)) ≤ 4n . Equating and rear-
ranging this, we obtain ? = 4
n
4n+3−1
and @ = 1
4n+3−1
. This yields
a pure protocol with ?∗ = ? and @∗ = @. To build an unbiased
estimator for this mechanism, the contribution from each report
is 5̂8 (G) =
(4n+3−1)IG (R (G8 ))−1
4n−1 , where IG (·) is the indicator func-
tion for whether its argument is equal to G . It then follows that
E[ 5̂8 (G)] = IG (R(G8)), and that
Var[ 5̂8 (G)] = (IG (R(G8))? (1−?)+(1−IG (R(G8))@(1−@))
(
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The variance term corresponding to case G8 ≠ G from (2) for DE is







3.3 Unary Encodings (OUE, SUE)
Unary encoding methods interpret the user’s input G8 as a one-
hot 3-dimensional vector 4 (G8 ) , and independently perturb each
bit. Hence, Y = {0, 1}3 . Suppose we retain the (sole) input 1 with
probability ? , and flip each 0 to a 1with probability@. This provides
a pure protocol with ? = ?∗ and @ = @∗, where we have the free-
dom to choose ? and @ subject to satisfying ? (1−@)/(1− ?)@ ≤ 4n
to ensure n-LDP1 . “Symmetric” unary encoding (SUE), as used in
RAPPOR [12] sets ? + @ = 1, yielding ? = 4
n/2
4n/2+1
and @ = 1
4n/2+1
.
The corresponding variance is ?@/(? −@)2 = 4n/2/(4n/2− 1)2. “Op-
timized” unary encoding (OUE, [15]) aims to minimize (2) subject
to ? (1−@)/(1− ?)@ = 4n . Rearranging this sets ? = @ 4
n
1+@4n−@ , and
hence ? − @ =
(4n−1)@ (1−@)




. We can minimize the factor in @ by taking
the partial derivative with respect to @ and equating to zero. This




. This fixes ? = 12 , i.e., the encoding retains the sole
original input 1with constant probability, while flipping zeros only
with smaller probability 1/(4n + 1).
3.4 Local Hashing (BLH, OLH, FLH)
As 3 gets larger, the dependence on 3 for DE is undesirable, and
subsequent approaches remove this dependency. The local hash-
ing approach has each user pick a hash function with which to
encode their input, and send back the hash function along with
the hashed input encoded via direct encoding [15]. Here, the do-
main of the hash is chosen to be 6, with 6 chosen as a function of
n, typically much smaller than 3 . That is, user 8 picks a (universal)
hash functionℎ8 that maps [3] → [6]. Next, the user applies direct
encoding to the hashed value ℎ8 (G8 ), and sends this output along
with the description of ℎ8 . From this, the aggregator can obtain an
unbiased estimator for 5̂ (ℎ8 (G)). This gives a pure protocol, where





4n+6−1 , while the probability that G ≠ G8 is mapped to
that hash value becomes the uniform chance @∗ = 1/6.
The variance contribution due to (2)
(4n+6−1)2
(6−1) (4n−1)2
. A simple case




. However, by choosing 6 − 1 = 4n (Optimal Local
Hashing, OLH) we minimize the factor
(4n+(6−1))2
(6−1)
, and hence ob-
tain a variance of 44
n
(4n−1)2
. Note that this leads us to choose ?∗ = 12 ,
i.e., we report the true hash value with probability half. A limita-
tion of the OLH approach is that it can be very slow. This is since
we need to make $ (=3) hash function calls to calculate which do-
main elements a user’s perturbed item contributes frequency to-
wards.
Here, we propose a “fast” heuristic modification which aims to
speed up the procedure, dubbed Fast Local Hashing (FLH). On the
1Considering neighboring inputs which differ in the location of the solitary 1 bit.
client-side, instead of sampling a hash function uniformly at ran-
dom from some universal hash family, we introduce a new parame-
ter : ′ and restrict clients to uniformly choosing from : ′ hash func-
tions. Hence, we sacrifice some theoretical guarantees on accuracy
in order to achieve computational gains on the server-side aggre-
gation. In practice, it turns out that even for small values of: ′, FLH
performs reasonably well.
The protocol is largely unchanged fromOLH. On the client-side,
we sample a hash function uniformly at random from {ℎ1, . . . ℎ:′}.
On the server-side, we pre-compute a : ′ × 3 matrix where each
row corresponds to a hash function and each column refers to a
domain value. We set the (8, 9)Cℎ entry to ℎ8 ( 9) to reduce the total
number of hash function calls from $ (=3) to $ (: ′3). The server
collates all reports for the same hash function, and process them
in a batch. To gain a speedup over OLH, we must choose : ′ ≪ =.
In our experiments (Section 7.1), we empirically validate FLH, and
show that it approaches OLH in accuracy when only sampling a
small number of hash functions, achieving a substantial speed up.
3.5 Hadamard Encodings (HM, HR)
We next consider two related approaches based on the Hadamard
transform. The Hadamard mechanism (HM) samples one (or more)
coefficients from theHadamard transformof the users input (treated
as a sparse vector), and applies direct encoding to the result [1, 4].
So Y = {−1,+1} and given a user’s input G8 ∈ D = [3], we
sample an index 9 ∈ [3], and compute the (scaled-up) coefficient
\
(8)
9 = qG8 , 9 = (−1)
〈G8 , 9 〉 (see Section 2.3). Then with probabil-
ity ? = 4
n
1+4n , the mechanism reports ( 9, \
(8)










n , this meets the LDP guar-
antee.
An advantage of HM is that it is much faster to process reports
from users, since the (fast) Hadamard inverse transform can be
applied to the (aggregated) reports. To build an unbiased estima-
tor for frequencies, we take the contribution of the inverse of the




9 . The unbiased esti-
mator for \ 9 is \̂ 9 /(2? − 1). For a given G , to estimate 5 (G), we
sum the contribution to 5 (G) from all reports. That is, 5̂8 (G) =∑
9 qG,9 · \̂
(8)
9 /(2? − 1) and 5̂ (G) =
∑
8 5̂8 (G) as before. We can inter-
pret the 9 ’th row of the Hadamard matrix as defining a (universal)
hash function on the input domain with range 6 = 2. The analysis




To improve this boundwhen 4n is large, we can sample C Hadamard
coefficients, to produce a hash function with 6 = 2C possible out-




otherwise perturbs it uniformly. The resulting variance from (2) is
(4n+2C−1)2
(2C−1) (4n−1)2
. If we can choose C so that 2C−1 = 4n ,2 then we obtain
the optimal variance of 44
n
(4n−1)2
. We can aggregate quickly by inter-
preting the hash value as C Hadamard coefficients, each of which is












. For 4n = 3 and C = 2, this fraction is 2/3.
2This is possible when 4n is moderately large, i.e., 4n = 3, 7, 15. . . .
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Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Oracle costs
FO Variance bound Decode time Communication
DE $ ((4n + 3 − 2)/(4n − 1)2) $ (= + 3) $ (log3)
SUE $ (4n/2/(4n/2 − 1)2) $ (=3) $ (3)
OUE $ (4n/(4n − 1)2) $ (=3) $ (3)
BLH $ ((4n + 1)2/(4n − 1)2) $ (=3) $ (log3)
OLH $ (4n/(4n − 1)2) $ (=3) $ (log3)
FLH (heuristic) $ (: ′3) $ (log3)
HM $ ((4n + 1)2/(4n − 1)2) $ (= + 3) $ (log3)
HR $ (4n/(4n − 1)2) $ (= + 3) $ (log3)
The Hadamard response protocol, HR, [3] also makes use of the
Hadamard matrix, and is very similar to HM. Each user with input
G8 will report the index of some Hadamard coefficient, i.e., some
9 , where the corresponding coefficient value is \ 9 = q (4
(G8 ) )) .
Equivalently, the set of all Hadamard coefficient values Θ corre-
spond to the G8 ’th column of Hadamard matrix q . With probability
? = 4
n
4n+1 , we report a 9 such that \ 9 = +1, otherwise (with proba-
bility @ = 14n+1 ), we report a coefficient 9 with \ 9 = −1. This again
represents a pure protocol, since by properties of the Hadamard
transform, ?∗ = ? , while @∗ = 12 . Hence, we compute our variance
bound as ( 4
n+1
4n−1 )
2. For higher privacy (smaller epsilon), a variant
protocol is based on the Hadamard matrix, but is no longer pure,
since the probability of G ′ being mapped to the support of G is no
longer the same for all G ′. This construction achieves a variance




3.6 Summary of Frequency Oracles
The concept of a frequency oracle is an abstraction of a private
protocol allowing us to accurately estimate the frequency of items
from a domain. The listed approaches achieve different combina-
tions of accuracy, speed and communication costs in order to guar-
antee n-LDP. We summarize the key properties in Table 1.
Across all frequency oracles, the variance obtained is quite sim-
ilar, with a dependence on 1
(4n−1)2
. When n is suitably small, we
have 4n ≈ 1+n, and so (4n − 1)−2 ≈ n−2. The numerator of the vari-
ance term is typically either (4n + 1)2 (for basic Hadamard mecha-
nism), or 44n (for Hadamard response, optimized local hashing and
optimized unary encoding). Since (G + 1)2 − 4G = (G − 1)2 > 0 for
G > 1, so 44n < (4n + 1)2, and hence we would expect these last
methods to obtain better accuracy, as we test in Section 7.
4 DOMAIN SIZE REDUCTION
When working with data over large domain sizes 3 , performing a
search for frequent items can be slow, and incur more false posi-
tives as we query more possibilities. A natural approach is to en-
code the input in a smaller domain, via techniques such as “sketch-
ing” [11]. We can first encode each user’s input into a small sketch,
then apply the frequency oracle to each sketch, so that an aggrega-
tor can reconstruct a sketch to query. Since the oracles described
above all rely on the user’s input being sparse (i.e., encoded by a 1-
hot vector), we seek sketches which are sparsity-preserving. Each
sketch is defined by an array with A rows and 2 columns, and some
hash functionswhichmap items to the array. Next, we survey three
sketch approaches that have been used for this purpose.
Bloom Filter. The Bloom filter (BF) is a well-known way to rep-
resent a set of items [6]. It makes use of : hash functions ℎ1 . . . ℎ:
which map [3] → [<]. This generates a one-dimensional binary
array of length<, whose 9 ’th entry is 1 if there is a hash function
ℎℓ (G) = 9 . Encoding a single user’s item G8 means that we obtain an
encoding with at most : 1’s set. Frequency oracles can be applied
by first sampling one of the hash functions ℎℓ , and then processing
the resulting one-hot encoding of ℎℓ (G8 ). Decoding the result and
obtaining an estimate from the noisily reconstructed Bloom filter
can be done e.g., using regularized regression as a heuristic [12].
Count-Min Sketches. The Count-Min (CM) sketch is similar to
the Bloom Filter, but now hash function ℎℓ maps to row ℓ of a A ×2
sized array [10]. Item G is then mapped to entry [ℓ, ℎℓ (G)] for each
ℓ , so the sketch can be treated as A one-hot vectors, one for each
of the A hash functions. The user first samples ℓ uniformly from
{1 . . . A }, and encodes ℎℓ (G8 ) using a frequency oracle. The aggre-
gator reconstructs a noisy sketch, and can estimate 5 (G) by con-
sidering the weights associated with ℎℓ (G): this can be via taking
the minimum, the mean, or the median (giving the Count-Mean or
Count-Median sketch, respectively, with appropriate corrections
to make the estimation unbiased [1, 11]). The variance introduced
due to sketching depends on 2 , the length of each row. Smaller
2 and A reduces the cost of storing and analyzing the sketch, but
larger 2 improves the accuracy.
Count Sketches.The Count sketch (CS) follows the description of
the CM sketch, but with one further twist: another hash function
6ℓ determines whether to represent G with a +1 or −1 value [7].
That is, the user samples ℓ uniformly from A , and encodes ℎℓ (G8 )
with a weight of 6ℓ (G8 ), where 6ℓ (G8 ) = {−1,+1}. This is most eas-
ily handled by the Hadamard mechanism, which handles negative
inputs without any modification. Other FOs can be extended to
handle negative weights, such as by handling positive and nega-
tive weights separately. To estimate 5 (G), the aggregator takes the
weight associated with ℎℓ (G), multiplied by 6ℓ (G). The variance
due to sketching also depends on 1/2 , as in the previous case.
5 HEAVY HITTER SEARCH
Domain size reduction reduces the size of the objects manipulated
in frequency estimation protocols. However, if the original domain
within which the items reside is very large, it is still costly for the
data analyst to search through the set of all possibilities to find
those with high frequency. For example, the input items may be
long strings (such as URLs), and it would be too slow to enumerate
all strings up to a fixed length. This is known as the “heavy hitters”
problem, and has been addressed extensively in the (non-private)
data streaming setting. Approaches that work in the local privacy
model are based on ideas from coding theory and group testing.
SequenceFragmentPuzzle (SFP).The core idea of the “sequence
fragment puzzle” (SFP) approach is that for a long string that is fre-
quent within a population, every substring will also be (at least
as) frequent [1]. Naively, we might try to find all frequent sub-
strings and glue them back together. However, this risks creating
false positives. For example, suppose “apples” and “orange” are
both frequent (6 character) strings. We could break these into 3
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character substrings, as “app”, “les”, “ora” and “nge”, which will all
be frequent. But when reconstructing, we should avoid reporting
non-frequent strings, such as “orales” or “ngeapp”. A heuristic ap-
proach is for each user to provide information on pairs of disjoint
substrings that co-occur together in their string – e.g., dividing
strings into four substrings so that one user may reporting on their
first and third substring, another on their third and fourth. This
gives the aggregator partial information about which substrings
co-occur frequently, allowing statistical inference to rebuild the
whole strings [13].
The SFPmethod gives a principled solutionwith two extra steps.
The first is to provide the index of each substring within the string,
and the second is to also tag each substring with a hash of the
whole string. In our example, the pieces might be represented as (1,
“app”, hash(apples)), (2, “les”, hash(apples)), (1, “ora”, hash(orange)),
(2, “nge”, hash(orange)). If an analyst detects these four tuples as
frequent then, provided there are no hash collisions, the only way
to combine them into strings yields the desired “apples” and “or-
ange”. In the LDP setting, each user takes their string and chooses a
substring, then encodes this substring concatenated with the hash
value via a frequency oracle (possibly with domain size reduction).
The index of the substring not need be kept private, and can be
sent without perturbation. This allows the analyst to find which
substrings are globally frequent by enumerating all possibilities,
and put these together to solve the ‘puzzle’.
There are several parameters to choose for SFP: (1) The length
of the substrings to consider. Too short, and there is a lot of work
to recombine the strings; too long, and the time cost of the analyst
to search the frequency oracles is too high. Apple’s implementa-
tion uses substrings of length 2-3 characters over the Roman alpha-
bet. (2) The size of the hash function. This should be large enough
to avoid collisions between frequent strings, but not so large that
it makes the concatenated message large. Apple’s implementation
uses an 8-bit hash. (3) How each user should select a substring to
report. The suggested approach is to pad each user string to the
same length, and uniformly sample a single index to report. In Ap-
ple’s example, strings are 10 characters long, and we sample one
of the five 2-character strings starting at an odd location.
Reporting a single substring per user achieves better accuracy
than reporting multiple substrings with a shared privacy budget.
To avoid false positives, we can additionally maintain a frequency
oracle over the full strings (at some privacy cost).
Hierarchical Search (PEM,TH).An alternative approach to find-
ing heavy hitters is hierarchically based. Considering the inputs as
strings, observe that if a string is a heavy hitter, then every prefix
will be at least as frequent within the population. So we can build
frequency oracles on prefixes of increasing length, and use these
to step towards the full length strings. The key to making this ef-
ficient is the converse of the above statement: if a prefix is not a
heavy hitter, then no extension of the prefix can be a heavy hitter
either.
The idea of hierarchical methods is to first enumerate all pre-
fixes of some fixed length (say, 2 or 3 alphabet characters), and es-
timate their frequency with an appropriate frequency oracle. This
yields a subset of heavy hitter prefixes. The next phase uses a fre-
quency oracle on prefixes of a longer length, and estimates the
frequency of all possible extensions of the heavy hitter prefixes.
This is repeated until we reach the limiting length of prefixes for
which a frequency oracle has been built. Variants on this idea are
known under various names – prefix extending method (PEM) [16],
TreeHistogram (TH) [4], and PrivTrie [14], but we group them to-
gether under the hierarchical search banner. The chief difference
is how they report information: in PEM, each user is equally likely
to report each prefix length, while in TH the privacy budget is split
evenly to report on both the full string and and a uniformly chosen
shorter prefix. As with SFP, there are several parameters to choose:
(1) The initial prefix length, and how long to extend the prefix by
in each phase; and (2) How each user should decide what informa-
tion to report. A natural choice is for each user to uniformly select
a prefix length from those specified, and only encode their input
once.
Error-correcting codes.Webrieflymention that other approaches
have been proposed based on applying error-correcting codes (ECC)
to allow recovering the heavy hitter strings. This general approach
was first presented by Bassily and Smith [5], and used in the Bit-
stogram protocol [4] to give improved theoretical bounds. How-
ever, we omit this approach from further consideration for brevity,
since it has not been widely implemented.
6 POST-PROCESSING
We finally address how additional post-processing can be done
on the outputs of frequency estimation and heavy hitter proto-
cols with the aim of improving accuracy. Post-processing is use-
ful, since the output of frequency oracles can be quite noisy: we
can obtain negative frequencies, or outputs which sum to more
the number of inputs. We consider the following options in our ex-
periments:
— No Normalization: No modification of the estimated frequencies.
— Non-Negative Normalization: We round all negative frequency
estimates to 0.
— Additive Normalization: We round negative estimates to 0. For
the rest of the values, we add/subtract some constant X to ensure
that
∑
E∈D>0 ( 5̃ (E) + X) = = where D>0 = {E : 5̃ (E) > 0}.
— Projection onto the probability simplex: Here we project our fre-
quency oracle onto the probability simplex, ensuring that
∑
E∈D 5̃ (E) =
=, 5̃ (E) ≥ 0. See [2] and [18] for more information.
— Threshold Cut: For threshold-cut, when estimating the whole do-
mainwe sort our frequency estimates in decreasing order and keep
them until we get a total frequency which is > =. At this point we
round every remaining estimate down to 0.
Note that applying some of these post-processing steps can be
quite time consuming when the domain is large. Non-negative nor-
malization is straightforward, but other post-processing requires
enumerating all possible items in the domain to determine the nor-
malization parameters. Thus, these can’t be applied for frequency
oracles over very large input domains.
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7 FREQUENCY ESTIMATION EXPERIMENTS
Our first experiments focus on the ability of different frequency or-
acles and their variants to estimate frequencies. We are mainly in-
terested inmeasuring themean squared error (MSE) of the frequen-
cies estimated over the whole domain i.e., 1
3
∑
G ∈D ( 5̂ (G) − 5 (G))
2 ,
which also serves as an empirical estimation of the variance.
All experiments were implemented in Python 3.7.4 and run on
aWindows PC, with an AMD Ryzen 5 3600 3.6GHz CPU and 16GB
of RAM. The code is publicly available 3. Unless stated otherwise
all, experiments were run 5 times with their results averaged. We
test the frequency oracles mainly on synthetic data generated from
a Zipf distribution with skewness B = 1.1.
7.1 Direct and Unary Encoding Methods
We start by comparing Direct Encoding (DE), Symmetric Unary
Encoding (SUE) and Optimal Unary Encoding (OUE) (Sections 3.2
and 3.3). In Figure 1a we see the effects of varying the privacy bud-
get n ∈ {0.5, 1, . . . , 5} while fixing 3 = 1024, = = 100,000. Although
the domain is not very large, OUE/SUE both outperform DE due
to the high amount of noise needed in DE. For relatively low val-
ues of n (high privacy) both OUE and SUE perform quite similarly,
however for larger values of n we can see OUE has the lower MSE
matching the theoretical results.
In Figure 1b we vary the domain size 3 ∈ {22, 23, . . . , 211} while
fixing n = 3, = = 100,000. For very small domains, DE has much
lower variance thanOUE/SUE, however at around3 = 26 OUE/SUE
start to outperform DE. This agrees with the theoretical results,
since the variance of DE scales in3 aswe require significantlymore
noise in order to maintain LDP across the domain.
In practice DE is fast and simple to implement, since all that
needs to be returned by a client is a single value in the domain.
OUE/SUE require perturbing a 3-length one-hot vector and send-
ing it to the server. When the domain is large, this is impractical
in terms of communication cost. Our results corroborate those of
[15].
7.2 Local Hashing Methods
We compare Optimised Local Hashing (OLH) with Binary Local
Hashing (BLH) (i.e., using a hash function with 6 = 2 possible
values) and with Fast Local Hashing (FLH). The parameter : ′ in
FLH determines the number of hash functions used, with larger
: ′ resulting in more accurate estimates at the expense of slower
server-side aggregation. In Figure 2 we fix 3 = 500, = = 1,000,000
and vary : ′ between 100 and 20,000 in increments of 100. The blue
line represents the MSE of FLH as we vary : ′, and the red line rep-
resents the average OLH error on the same data. As : ′ increases,
the MSE of FLH approaches that of OLH. At around : ′ = 10,000
the accuracy of FLH is indistinguishable from that of OLH. When
: ′ = 10,000, FLH’s aggregation is ≈ 6x faster than OLH.
Figure 3 shows experiments for varying both n and 3 for OLH,
BLH and FLHwith: ′ = 100, 500, 1000, 5000, 10,000. Figure 3a shows
the effect of varying n ∈ {0.5, 1, . . . , 5} with 3 = 1024, = = 100, 000.
We observe that the MSE of BLH is consistent for different n values,
and as noted by [15] this is likely due to the use of a binary hash
3https://github.com/Samuel-Maddock/pure-LDP
function losing a lot of information, making BLH relatively robust
to low n values. OLH has the lowest MSE followed closely by the
FLH oracles in decreasing order of their : ′ value, as we would ex-
pect. We see similar relative behavior as we vary 3 in Figure 3b.
Meanwhile, in Figure 3c, we plot the total time taken across all
client/server calculations as we vary 3 . Since we are enumerating
the entire domain, this naturally has a linear dependency on3 . Nev-
ertheless, we can see the effect that small values of : in FLH have
in terms of reducing the total time taken compared to OLH and
BLH, which both have to iterate over = different hash functions. A
smaller : ′ parameter reduces the aggregation time of the server,
but both client-side perturbation and server-side estimation take
the same amount of time.
7.3 Hadamard Methods
We compare the two Hadamard-based approaches (Section 3.5):
Hadamard Mechanism (HM) and Hadamard Response (HR). The
main parameter of the Hadamard Mechanism is the number of
Hadamard coefficients to sample, which we denote as C . In Fig-
ure 4a we fix 3 = 1024, = = 100,000 while varying C along the
G-axis with each line representing a different value of n. We see
that for low values of n (high privacy) that the optimal value is
C = 1, whereas for n = 3, C = 3 has the lowest MSE. Generally we
see optimal values for C = ⌈n⌉, consistent with our analysis of this
mechanism.
In Figure 4b we vary n while fixing 3 = 1024, = = 100,000. We
compare the MSE of HR with the HM with C = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. We can
see that for the smaller n values HR and HM perform very similarly
when using the optimal values of C = 1, 2. Additional experiments
were performed in the low privacy regime (n < 1) and we found
that the performance of HR and HM were almost identical but we
omit these plots for brevity. For higher n values (n > 3), HR starts
to outperform the HM oracles, which is quite notable for methods
which appear so similar on paper. In Figure 4c we vary 3 while
fixing n = 3, = = 100,000. We can again see that HM C = 3 has the
best MSE for n = 3, but still more than that of HR for the large
domains. For very small domains, the behavior is quite variable,
but nevertheless HM appears preferable in this regime.
7.4 Cross-comparison of Frequency Oracles
In Figure 5 we compare OUE, OLH, FLH, HR and HM, varying n, 3
and looking at the total time taken.We omit DE since we have seen
that its performance decreases in larger domains, and BLH/SUE
since OLH/OUE have better performance. For FLH we take : ′ =
10,000 and for HM we take C = 3 when using n = 3 otherwise we
use the optimal C values as found in Figure 4a.
In Figure 5a, we vary n ∈ {0.5, 1, . . . , 5}, fixing 3 = 1024, = =
100,000. We can see for low n values (high privacy) that the tech-
niques have comparable MSE values. As n increases we can begin
to see a split between the Hadamard technique (HR, HM) and the
local hashing methods, with local hashing methods having lower
MSE. Similarly in Figure 5b, we vary 3 ∈ {22, . . . , 211}. We can
see that as 3 increases the split between the Hadamard and local
hashing methods ismore apparent. For very small domain sizes the
techniques are comparable, but as 3 grows large the local hashing
methods have lower MSE. Finally we look at the total time taken
Frequency Estimation under Local Differential Privacy [Experiments, Analysis and Benchmarks]





























(a) Varying n, fixing 3 = 1024, = = 100, 000

























(b) Varying 3 , fixing n = 3, = = 100, 000

















(c) Total time taken as 3 varies
Figure 1: DE, SUE, OUE Experiments
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Figure 2: Effect of varying : ′ in FLH,
3 = 500, = = 1,000,000, n = 3
by the oracles as we vary 3 in our experiments shown in Figure 5c.
As noted previously, the local hashing methods are slow as 3 in-
creases and we can see the comparison in time between OLH and
FLH with : ′ = 10, 000. HR is the fastest technique, followed by HM
and then OUE.We can clearly see that as the domain size increases,
the local hashing methods are much slower.
It should be noted that in these comparisons we use HM with
C = 3 where the aggregation time takes 3x longer than HM with
C = 1, since each user sends three Hadamard coefficients. For C = 1,
HM takes almost exactly the same total time as HR and there is lit-
tle difference in time between them, except that HM’s aggregation
time increases as C does. Out of all these techniques, OUE is the
only one with $ (3) communication cost and as 3 grows further
OUE would struggle to be competitive with the other techniques.
7.5 Domain Reduction Methods
Next, we experimentally compare domain reduction methods (in-
troduced in Section 4) which we combine with various FOs to allow
us to efficiently estimate frequencies over very large domains. We
devote particular attention to the following combinations:
• Count-Sketch (CS) and Count-Min Sketch (CM) methods
with FLH, Hadamard Response (HR), HadamardMech (HM)
• Bloom filters with Direct Encoding (DE) (the basis of the
RAPPOR system [12])
• Apple’s proposal of Count-Mean Sketch (CMS) as CM (Mean)
sketchwithOUE and Hadamard CountMean Sketch (HCMS)
as CM (Mean) with HM (C = 1) [1]
In these experiments we now increase the number of users to = =
1,000,000 and vary 3 from 10,000 to 100,000 in increments of 10,000.
We again use synthetic data following a Zipf distribution. Along
with reporting MSE we also consider :-MSE which calculates the
MSE over a subset of the top-: most frequent elements in the do-
main. We fix : = 50 in all experiments. We show this metric be-
cause as 3 grows large, there will be many elements in the domain
that have small (or close to 0) frequency. Hence, if a frequency ora-
clewas to underestimate frequencies (or predict close to 0) it would
have a (misleadingly) low MSE but a very high :-MSE as it would
fail to accurately estimate the top-: frequent elements. As we will
see, there is often a trade-off in large domains between achieving
a low MSE and a low :-MSE.
7.5.1 Varying Parameters in RAPPOR. The RAPPOR method com-
bines Bloom filters with the Direct Encoding (DE) FO. One diffi-
culty in using Bloom filters is that the estimation is not as straight-
forward as using sketches. The RAPPOR paper describes an esti-
mation method using regularised regression for both selecting do-
main elements that could be frequent (via LASSO) and then esti-
mating the frequencies of these elements (via non-negative ridge
regression).
In Figure 6, we run an experiment varying the regularisation pa-
rameter U used in the ridge regression that estimates frequencies
from the Bloom filters. We fix = = 1,000,000, n = 3, 3 = 100,000
and plot three lines, each of which corresponds to a Bloom filter of
size< = 32, 64, 128. We can immediately note two things: Increas-
ing the size of the Bloom filters results in lower MSE and that the
correct choice of regularisation can lead to improved MSE perfor-
mance. The best regularisation value found was 0.005 but values in
the range 0.005−0.01 have very similar MSE values. Aswe increase
or decrease the regularisation from this point the MSE of RAPPOR
begins to suffer. The optimal value of regularisation is likely to be
Graham Cormode, Samuel Maddock, Carsten Maple



























(a) Varying n, fixing 3 = 1024, = = 100, 000



























(b) Varying 3 , fixing n = 3, = = 100, 000

























(c) Total time taken as 3 varies
Figure 3: Local Hashing (BLH, OLH, FLH) Experiments
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

































(a) Varying C and n values for HM, fixing
3 = 1024, = = 100,000






























(b) Varying n, fixing 3 = 1024, = = 100,000
































(c) Varying 3 , fixing n = 3, = = 100,000
Figure 4: Hadamard Experiments



























(a) Varying n, fixing 3 = 1024, = = 100,000



























(b) Varying 3 , fixing n = 3, = = 100,000























(c) Total time taken as 3 varies
Figure 5: Comparison Experiments
specific to the distribution of the data that is being collected, which
may not be known in advance.
7.5.2 Varying Sketch Parameters in SketchOracles. One of themost
popular deployments of sketch-based LDP frequency oracles are
Apple’s (H)CMS methods [1]. The CMS technique can be thought
of as a frequency oracle that combines a Count-Mean sketch with
the OUE frequency oracle while its Hadamard variant is effectively
theHadamardMechanism (HM) oracle combinedwithCount-Mean
sketch. As explained in Section 4, sketch methods consist of A hash
functions that map elements to a row of a A×2 sized array.We there-
fore first look at the effect of varying these sketch parameters A, 2 .
We consider both Count-Sketch (CS) and Count-Min sketch (CM)
methods with variants that take either the mean, median or mini-
mum of the sketch matrix to produce final frequency estimates.



































Figure 6: Varying the regularisation parameter (U) in
RAPPOR, fixing n = 3, 3 = 100,000, = = 1,000,000
In Figure 7 we vary the choice of sketch method and fix the fre-
quency oracle to be FLH with : ′ = 500. We run experiments with
= = 1,000,000 users, 3 = 100,000 and n = 3. Figures 7a and 7b
show both the MSE and :-MSE of the sketch methods while vary-
ing the size of the sketch vector 2 ∈ {32, 64, . . . , 2048} and fixing
the number of hash functions to A = 32. We can see that in gen-
eral CM methods perform slightly better than CS methods, with a
lower MSE. As we would expect, we see that increasing the size
of the sketch vector 2 decreases the MSE across all methods. Fig-
ure 7b shows an interesting trend in :-MSE for sketches that take
the minimum estimate: while fixing A and increasing 2 , the :-MSE
begins to slowly increase and after the 2 = 256 point the median
and mean methods begin to outperform the minimum.
In Figure 7c we repeat the same experiment but vary the num-
ber of hash functions, A ∈ {2, 4, . . . , 512} and fix 2 = 1024. We
only present the :-MSE graph for varying A , since we found that
the MSE graph for varying A showed very similar behaviour to Fig-
ure 7awith a general decrease inMSE as the parameter is increased.
Broadly, we see a similar pattern to the previous experiment—with
CMmethods slightly outperforming the CSmethods. However, the
notable difference is in the :-MSE graph, where increasing A re-
sults in worse :-MSE performance for sketch methods that take
the minimum as their estimate.
7.5.3 Comparing Sketch EstimationMethods. Across all of Figure 7
we can see that the choice of sketch estimate quite clearly affects
both the MSE and :-MSE performance. We see that using sketches
that take the Minimum as the estimate have the lowest MSE fol-
lowed by Mean and then the Median. However, the picture be-
comes more complex when we look at the :-MSE plot in Figure 7c.
Here the results are somewhat reversed, with Min methods per-
forming the worst followed by Median and then Mean. As men-
tioned, as the number of hash functions A is increasing, the :-MSE
of the Minimum methods begin to increase.
The likely reason for this is that as the number of hash func-
tion increase, the number of users are effectively split into cohorts
where their data contributes to a single row of the sketch matrix.
This means as A increases, the user base is split between A fre-
quency oracles each of which estimate a single row in the sketch.
This will lead to noisy estimates that underestimate the true fre-
quencies. So by taking the minimum of these rows we underesti-
mate the true frequencies. Generally, it seems that for small A and
large 2 the Mean and Median are comparable and achieve the best
balance between MSE and :-MSE.
7.5.4 Sketching vs Bloom Filters. In Figure 8 we compare the vari-
ous sketchingmethodswith the Bloomfilter approach (implemented
via RAPPOR). Since RAPPOR can be thought of as a Bloom filter
combined with the Direct Encoding (DE) frequency oracle, we also
compare sketching methods that use DE as their oracle. To ensure
a fair comparison we fix the sketch sizes to A = 16, 2 = 128 to
match that of a Bloom filter with size< = 128. For the Bloom filter
we also use : = 2 hash functions and 8 cohorts. We fix the regu-
larisation parameter to be U = 0.005 as informed by our previous
experiments. We fix n = 3, = = 1,000,000 and vary 3 . We observe
generally that in this small sketch regime the Bloomfilter approach
is certainly competitive. It achieves MSE that is similar CS (Min)
and begins to outperform it as 3 increases. This also occurs when
we look at the :-MSE.
Interestingly, when we look at this small sketch regime taking
the minimum as the sketch estimate leads to better performing or-
acles in both MSE and :-MSE, different to what we saw for much
larger sketches. Since we have a very large domain and a small
sketch, there is likely to be many collisions in the sketch. Taking
the minimum seems to be more robust to collisions in the sketch
whereas themean andmedian strugglewith this on smaller sketches.
There are limitations to the Bloom filter approach. The first is that
using DE restricts us to using relatively small Bloom filters since
the variance of DE scales in the size of the domain. The second, as
previously referenced, is the difficult choice of regularisation and
the complicated estimation procedure. Consequently, we drop the
Bloom filter approach from subsequent experiments.
7.5.5 Comparing Sketching Using Different Frequency Oracles. We
now compare the sketching methods while varying the frequency
oracles used to privatise data. Since our previous experiments have
shown that Count-Sketchmethods performslightlyworse, we omit
them from our comparison. Instead we compare Apple’s CMS and
HCMS (as CM (Mean) OUE and CMS (Mean) HM (C = 1), respec-
tively) and CM (Median) with FLH, HR and HM as its oracle. For
HM we fix C = 3 when n = 3 otherwise we use optimal C values
found from our previous experiments. We also plot CM (Mean) HM
(C = 3) to see if there is direct improvement over Apple’s HCMS.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 9 and 10 where we
fix A = 32, 2 = 1024, = = 1,000,000.
In Figure 10 we vary n while fixing 3 = 100,000. We can see that
for low n values the Mean methods outperform the other sketches
but as n increases CM with FLH has the best performance. Out of
the frequency oracles used for CM, it seems that FLH performs
the best followed by HR and then HM. As we have seen, when we
increase : ′ in the FLH oracle the MSE is reduced. We have cho-
sen : ′ = 500 to ensure that sketching with FLH, HR and HM take
roughly the same amount of total time. Increasing : ′ will make the
overall oracle slower but could increase accuracy further. In gen-
eral, all of the sketching methods we have compared have almost
identical client and server-side processing times.
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(a) MSE varying 2 fixing
A = 32, 3 = 100,000, n = 3
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(b) :-MSE varying 2 fixing
A = 32, 3 = 100,000, n = 3
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(c) :-MSE varying A fixing
2 = 1024, 3 = 100,000, n = 3
Figure 7: Varying Sketch Vector Size (2) and Number of Hash functions (A ) with different sketch methods
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Figure 8: MSE (left) and :-MSE (right) comparison of Bloom-filter, Sketch and Count-Sketch with Direct Encoding (DE).
Fixing n = 3, A = 16, 2 =< = 128






































0) CM (Median) with FLH 
CM (Median) with HR 
CM (Median) with HM t=3
CM (Mean) with OUE
CM (Mean) with HM t=1
CM (Mean) with HM t=3
Figure 9: MSE (left) and k-MSE (right) comparing Count-Median sketch methods (with FLH, HR, HM) and Apple’s
CMS/HCMS while varying 3 , fixing n = 3, = = 1,000,000, A = 32, 2 = 1024
In Figure 9 we fix n = 3 and vary the domain size. We can
see that CM (Mean) OUE and CM (Median) FLH achieve the low-
est MSE and when looking at the :-MSE it seems that in general
the CM (Median) methods have lower :-MSE than CM (Mean).
We also note that CM (Mean) with HM (C = 3) outperforms tak-
ing CM (Mean) HM (C = 1) and therefore improvements in Ap-
ple’s current deployment of HCMS could be made by modifying
their protocol to sample more Hadamard coefficients. Addition-
ally, the CM sketching oracles have a logarithmic communication
cost of$ (log2) which for large sketches is much smaller than CM
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Figure 10: MSE while varying n, fixing
3 = 100,000, = = 1,000,000, A = 32, 2 = 1024
(Mean) OUE’s$ (2) communication. It seems that the CM (Median)
FLH method has similar performance to CM OUE, yet achieves
smaller communication cost without loss of accuracy. By express-
ing Apple’s (H)CMS protocols in our framework we have high-
lighted some modifications and variations that lead to increased
performance.
7.6 Post-Processing Experiments
We next run experiments using the post-processing methods de-
scribed in Section 6. Figure 11 shows the results, fixing3 = 100,000, n =
3, = = 1,000,000 and varying the post-processing methods used on
a FLH oracle with : ′ = 500.
Just like sketching, the different post-processing methods also
have a MSE/:-MSE trade-off. As we would intuitively expect, non-
negative normalisation results in better MSE and :-MSE perfor-
mance than performing no post-processing at all. Additive Nor-
malisation and Threshold Cut post-processing strike a balance be-
tween MSE and :-MSE. For additive normalisation it seems that
the combination of rounding negative values and normalising in-
dividual estimates to match the total number of users helps to de-
crease MSE while still retaining accurate top-: estimates ensuring
a relatively low :-MSE. For thresholding, we achieve a lower MSE
by rounding values after the threshold down to 0 but during this
process we seem to round down certain top-: values which inflates
its :-MSE. For large domains projecting the results onto a proba-
bility simplex pushes the estimates down, resulting in a low MSE
but a very high :-MSE since frequent domain items have their es-
timates reduced.
Overall it seems that additive normalisation has the best bal-
ance between MSE/:-MSE, but non-negative normalisation also
performswell and is clearly a better choice than no post-processing.
Note that for sketching oracles, we can consider two areas to per-
form post-processing, one that can be performed on the internal
frequency oracles that estimate counts in sketch rows, and a sec-
ond post-processing step over the entire sketch oracle itself when
estimating the domain. Our tests showed that taking combinations
of additive normalisation in both of these give the best balance of
:-MSE/MSE, but we omit these plots here.
8 HEAVY HITTER EXPERIMENTS
We conclude our experiments by applying the frequency oracles
to the heavy hitter (HH) problem. We consider three popular im-
plementations of LDP HH techniques, Apple’s Sequence Fragment
Puzzle (SFP) [1], and two from the Hierarchical Search framework:
Prefix Extending Method (PEM) [16] and TreeHistogram (TH) [4,
5].
Heavy Hitters Dataset. We base our HH experiments on a sub-
set of the 2006 AOL search query dataset. The AOL dataset, among
other things, contains both search queries by users and (depending
on if they clicked on a website) the URL of the website they chose.
We focus only on the clicked URLs and not the search queries
themselves.4 This forms a dataset of 1,935,614 URLs, with 383,467
uniqueURLs. Themost popular among them arewebsites like “google.com”,
“yahoo.com” and “myspace.com”. The goal of applying HH tech-
niques in this scenario is to discover the most popular URLs that
were clicked by users. Additional pre-processing was performed
to strip website URLs of leading domain prefixes like “www.” and
“https://” but domain suffixes like “.com” were left untouched.
8.1 Experiment Parameters
We run combinations of heavy hitter search protocols (PEM, SFP,
TH) with various sketch-based frequency oracles with the goal of
finding the best combination of frequency oracle and heavy-hitter
search technique for this dataset. We run the HH + FO combi-
nations to attempt to find the top-10 most frequent URLs in the
dataset. We privatise all 1,935,614 URLs with a privacy budget of
n = 3, which for SFP and TH is split evenly into n = 1.5 for both
the fragment and word estimator. We measure the performance
via the precision, recall and the associated F1 score calculated by
comparing the strings found to the true top-10 frequent URLs in
the dataset.
We truncate all URLs in the dataset to a length of 6 characters.
Across all the HH protocols, we fix the length of prefixes that are
used to build up the HHs to be a length of 2 characters. We run two
variations of the HH protocols for ) = 10, 20 where ) denotes the
number of top-T prefixes that are used to build up the heavy hitters
at each stage of the protocol.While each of the three HH protocols
differ in how they do this, all of them estimate some combination
of top-) prefixes from which they build up their HH predictions.
For the frequency oracles we choose Apple’s CMS (as CM (Mean) +
OUE), HCMS (as CM (Mean) + HM) and CM FLH (Median) to com-
pare with current HH deployments that use (H)CMS. We use three
sketch-size variants (A, 2): (32, 1024), (128, 1024), (1024, 2048). Over-
all, this results in a total of 54 combinations, each of which is re-
peated 5 times with the results averaged.
8.2 Results
In Table 2, we present the top-20 combinations of HH + FO sorted
by their F1 score. The most striking result is that PEM dominates
SFP and TH in terms of the F1 score, no matter the oracle that
we choose. These results corroborate similar experiments in [16],
however they choose to just fix the oracle to be OLH and compare
PEM with slight variations of hierarchical search techniques.
4TheAOL dataset canbe accessedhere: http://www.cim.mcgill.ca/~dudek/206/Logs/AOL-user-ct-collection/
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Figure 11: MSE (left) and :-MSE (right) of various post-processing techniques on FLH, varying 3 and fixing n = 3, = = 1, 000, 000
Table 2: Top 20 HH + FO Combinations on the AOL dataset based on F1 scores. The standard deviations of F1 scores are
presented in parentheses. The maximum values of precision, recall and F1 are in bold.
Heavy Hitter Sketch Method Frequency Oracle Parameters Precision Recall F1 Score
1 PEM CM (Median) FLH T=20, r=1024, c=2048 0.822 0.74 0.779 (0.052)
2 PEM CM (Median) FLH T=20, r=128, c=1024 0.789 0.74 0.763 (0.051)
3 PEM CM (Mean) OUE T=10, r=1024, c=2048 0.626 0.96 0.757 (0.057)
4 PEM CM (Mean) OUE T=20, r=32, c=1024 0.782 0.72 0.749 (0.025)
5 PEM CM (Median) FLH T=10, r=1024, c=2048 0.758 0.74 0.748 (0.061)
6 PEM CM (Mean) OUE T=20, r=128, c=1024 0.786 0.70 0.738 (0.035)
7 PEM CM (Mean) OUE T=10, r=32, c=1024 0.782 0.70 0.738 (0.025)
8 PEM CM (Median) FLH T=20, r=32, c=1024 0.792 0.68 0.731 (0.036)
9 PEM CM (Mean) OUE T=20, r=1024, c=2048 0.766 0.70 0.73 (0.029)
10 PEM CM (Median) FLH T=10, r=32, c=1024 0.744 0.70 0.721 (0.055)
11 PEM CM (Median) FLH T=10, r=128, c=1024 0.552 0.88 0.677 (0.031)
12 PEM CM (Mean) OUE T=10, r=128, c=1024 0.541 0.88 0.669 (0.076)
13 PEM CM (Mean) HM (t=1) T=20, r=128, c=1024 0.616 0.60 0.607 (0.098)
14 PEM CM (Mean) HM (t=1) T=20, r=1024, c=2048 0.580 0.56 0.569 (0.093)
15 PEM CM (Mean) HM (t=1) T=10, r=32, c=1024 0.551 0.54 0.545 (0.1)
16 PEM CM (Mean) HM (t=1) T=20, r=32, c=1024 0.516 0.48 0.496 (0.052)
17 SFP CM (Mean) OUE T=10, r=128, c=1024 0.967 0.32 0.465 (0.12)
18 SFP CM (Mean) OUE T=10, r=1024, c=2048 0.960 0.30 0.45 (0.065)
19 SFP CM (Mean) OUE T=20, r=1024, c=2048 1.000 0.28 0.436 (0.051)
20 PEM CM (Mean) HM (t=1) T=10, r=128, c=1024 0.322 0.62 0.424 (0.046)
Focusing on the PEM results, CM FLH has the best F1 perfor-
mance for the two larger sketch-size variations with ) = 20, fol-
lowed by CMS (i.e., CM (Mean) with OUE) with the largest sketch-
size variant. While the F1 scores of using CMS and CM FLH with
PEM on this dataset are very comparable, the most notable result
here is that we can achieve slightly better F1 scores than CMSwith
both much smaller sketch-sizes and much lower communication
cost by using CM FLH. To achieve an equivalent communication
cost we would have to use HCMS which as we can observe per-
forms notably worse than CM FLH.
For SFP, the table suggests that combining it with CMS outper-
forms SFP with CM FLH. Looking back at Figure 10, we can start to
see why this would be the case. Since SFP splits the privacy budget
between estimating fragments and words, then both oracles in our
experiments use n = 1.5. Our experiments in Figure 10 show that
for lower privacy budgets, CMS outperforms CM FLH and this is
the likely cause to the better performance of SFP + CMS. Just like
for PEM, we see that CM FLH outperforms HCMSwhen combined
with SFP as well.
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have seen that methods for collecting frequency statistics un-
der the model of local differential privacy can be practical and
accurate. Although there are many variations, by viewing them
through our four layer model, it is possible to navigate the large
space of possibilities to identify the most effective combinations.
Our experimental findings can be summarized as follows:
Frequency oracles. For small domains, up to hundreds or thou-
sands in size, methods based on local hashing are most effective.
Our proposed “fast” local hashing (FLH) approach is several times
Frequency Estimation under Local Differential Privacy [Experiments, Analysis and Benchmarks]
faster than optimal local hashing (OLH), without much loss of ac-
curacy. For larger domains, Hadamard-based approaches, partic-
ularly Hadamard response (HR) is almost as accurate but can be
orders of magnitude faster.
Domain size reduction. For larger domains, domain size reduc-
tion via sketches works well. Count-min sketch based approaches
seemmarginally preferable to Count sketch ones, using estimation
with median or mean performing best across a range of domain
sizes up to hundreds of thousands.
Post-processing. Post-processing reduces error, with the method
of rounding negative values to zero being simplest, while adding a
small normalization constant proving a good choice when feasible.
Heavy hitters. Combining all these to solve heavy hitters prob-
lems, the combination of sketching with local hashing seems the
best overall, though other similar parameter settings do almost as
well. The hierarchical encoding, in particular the prefix encoding
method (PEM) clearly dominates other choices.
Last, we note that while we focus on frequency statistics, it is
natural to extend these methods to related questions, such as quan-
tiles and range queries, using transformations that are by now stan-
dard [9].
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